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Abstract 
Explanations of the dynamics of EU judicial politics must also account for its incidence, 
namely when and in which sectors litigation of EU law and ECJ judgments occur. This 
incidence, it is suggested relies on a relationship between three arenas, those for norm-setting, 
litigation and judgments, as events in each of these arena conditions possibilities for action in 
the others. This paper analyses the relationship between these arenas through a study of all 
2007-9 preliminary rulings and finds EU judicial politics characterised by two predominant 
dynamics. ‘Patrol norms’ dedicated to securing common policies give rise to low salient 
judgments dominated by transnational enterprise and national administration litigation. 
‘Thickly evaluative norms’ are concerned with articulating certain values. Dominated by 
litigation by domestic undertakings and non-commercial actors, these norms generate the 
Court’s salient judgments. 
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The Reference Points of  
EU Judicial Politics 
 
1. Introduction 
Most recent accounts accept that no single narrative fully explains EU judicial 
politics (Alter 2009: 22-25; Jupille and Caporaso 2009; Kelemen 2011: 39-40). 
Research will accordingly need to consider the conditions under which one 
narrative holds rather than another. Comparison of patterns of litigation or 
adjudication across sectors or from different territories will go some way 
towards answering this. However, any comparison will also have to include 
analysis of the incidence of EU judicial politics, namely when and where it 
takes place. For the decision to enact a norm susceptible to judicial politics, to 
litigate or to refer a matter to the Court always involves a choice when other 
alternatives are available, and these choices set the conditions for judicial 
politics. Acceptance of such a relationship between the incidence and 
dynamics of EU judicial politics has two immediate implications. First, it 
necessarily problematises the significance of EU judicial politics. As we shall 
see, very few EU legal norms are susceptible to the traditionally understood 
form of judicial politics which emerges from national courts and ascends to 
the Court of Justice. Adjudication rates between EU legal sectors vary 
significantly (Chalmers 2000: 179) and litigation patterns are often 
significantly affected by external unpredictable factors (Cichowski 2007: 32-
34). Thinking about incidence not only helps us with the determinants of EU 
judicial politics but also informs us about the nature of the judicial beast. 
Secondly, it goes to the scope of inquiry. Any research into EU judicial politics 
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must analyse the relationship between the adjudicated legal norm, the 
litigants/referring court and the decision of the Court itself as each is a pre-
condition for the presence of the other. Neither the dynamics nor incidence of 
EU judicial politics can, thus, be considered without analysis of all three of 
these elements. 
By analysing all preliminary rulings given in 2007-2009 through the lens of 
this relationship we find EU judicial politics to be sectorally confined, highly 
institutionally autonomous, and, in many ways, characterised a different 
mission from other parts of the integration process. It is, furthermore, 
dominated by two dynamics. The first is where the EU law-maker enlists the 
judiciary’s help to secure common policies, typically those of the regulatory 
State. It is deployed to ensure the main protagonists meet their mutual 
commitments to one another. Litigation is dominated by constituencies 
influential in the law-making process and judgments tend not to be salient as 
the judicial role is about policing these commitments and finessing differences 
between these constituencies. The other is where EU legal instruments orient 
themselves more exclusively to the allocation of values rather than to securing 
common policies. These instruments are much rarer but generate a dynamic 
dominated by recursive case law and litigants, be they small industry or non-
commercial actors, who are both domestic and enjoy traditionally limited 
influence within the law-making process. It is the bringing of the Court of 
Justice into this peculiar admixture of domestic disagreement, value 
iconography and redrawing of the boundaries of elite competition within this 
second process that has given the Court of Justice its prominence.   
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2.  The Arenas of EU Judicial Politics 
The litigated norm, the identity of the litigant and the judgment itself are each 
indispensable to EU judicial politics. The litigated norm determines the level 
and form of judicial involvement and the Court’s relationship with different 
constituencies. The litigants (and referring courts) provide the demand for 
judgments, frame the questions asked of the Court and provide expertise to 
the Court in the form of legal arguments and evidence as to how legal norms 
are experienced. The judgment is determinative of the dispute and constrains 
litigants and law-makers. Their interdependence leads to EU judicial politics 
being played out as a series of sequential interactions in three arenas: 
• The decision by the law-maker, be it Treaty framer or Union 
legislature, to enact norms susceptible to judicial politics;1   
• The decision by parties to litigate and to involve the Court of Justice 
through seeking a preliminary reference;  
• The judicial decision itself.  
The relationship between these arenas structures interactions in three ways. 
First, with the exception of the initial law-maker, prior outcomes from one 
arena structure possibilities in the other arenas. Secondly, most actors must 
factor into their decision-making a calculus of legal risk which anticipates 
responses to their decisions not only in the current arena but in the other two 
arenas. Judgments may provoke possible undesirable legal reforms or 
vexatious litigation. New laws may generate undesirable patterns of litigation 
and opportunities for judicial activism. Reckless litigation may induce 
legislative and judicial responses depriving litigants of current benefits.  
                                                        
1 Law-maker is used to refer to both Treaty framing and secondary legislation in the rest of this 
article. 
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Thirdly, as decision-making in each arena can never take place 
simultaneously with decision-making in other arenas, the mixture of prior 
outcomes and legal risk facing parties in each arena will always be different.  
The calculus of choice for parties is not an abstract one. It is informed by the 
formal procedures set out in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which 
constrain possibilities and set out incentive structures. The preliminary 
reference procedure in Article 267 Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) is, in this regard, the epicentre of EU judicial politics.  It and the 
enforcement procedure accounted in 2009 for 87.8% of the judgments 
delivered by the Court with it accounting for 49.9% (European Court of 
Justice 2010: 87). It places the Court of Justice at the forefront of the decision-
making process and involves a wider range of constituencies as references 
emerge from litigation involving potentially any kind of party before any 
style of Union court or tribunal with the latter often seeking expertise on 
issues where there is no consensus about the content of EU law.  By contrast, 
enforcement procedures against Member States are preceded by lengthy 
Commission-Member State negotiations with only a small proportion (in 2009 
about 4 %) reaching judgment (European Commission 2010: 3). It is thus an 
arena of dispute settlement of last resort with the Commission winning 92.7% 
of the cases in 2005-2009 (European Court of Justice 2010: 93). This leads to 
more salient and controversial issues being decided more frequently under 
the preliminary reference procedure. Thus, 73% of the judgments cited as 
significant during the period by the Court in its Annual Reports were 
preliminary rulings (European Court of Justice 2008: 11-50; European Court of 
Justice 2009: 11-53; European Court of Justice 2010:11-53).  
The remainder of this article looks at how these interactions are played out 
through an analysis of all preliminary rulings given by the Court of Justice in 
the years 2007-9. There were 549 judgments generating 8981 observations. 
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Some time after the completion of the area of freedom, security and justice 
and the 2004 enlargements for possible effects to be felt on the case law, the 
period is also sufficiently proximate to obtain reliable socio-economic data 
about the composition of the litigants. 
 
3. The EU Law-Maker and the Remit of the Judicial 
Game 
(i) Judicial Politics a Confined and Unrepresentative Form of Integration 
EU law-makers have a choice whether or not to include justiciable 
entitlements that can be invoked in domestic courts and subject to Article 267 
TFEU in their laws. The risk is that judges and litigants will interpret and 
apply these in ways that deviate from their preferences. Benefits are 
potentially two-fold. First, in the case of realisation of common goods and 
policies, judicial enforcement can help secure credibility of legislative 
commitments, which is, in turn, seen as necessary to prevent free-riding and 
as a precondition for policy effectiveness. Secondly, it can be used to 
institutionalise value-commitments which are articulated as deeply held but 
set out only generally in legal documents because of uncertainty and veiled 
disagreement as to their scope (e.g. civil liberties, liberal market values). The 
two roles are distinct. The former is concerned with the judiciary contributing 
to realising a densely institutionalised common policy as one cog in a wider 
settlement. With the latter, the judiciary is deployed to reinforce certain belief-
systems and to deter egregious behaviour by increasing the costs of violation - 
be this financially or by naming and shaming (Howse and Teitel 2010: 131). 
The former is more prevalent in the EU. Its centre of gravity is still that of the 
regulatory State with little explicit role for in the direct allocation of values. 
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EU law-makers’ interest in the judiciary is, thus, largely concerned with its 
first role of contributing to common goods rather than its latter one of 
reinforcing certain belief-systems. 
The first implication of this is that EU law-makers would only exceptionally 
be interested in granting justiciable entitlements subject to Article 267 TFEU. 
A substitute procedure, the Article 258 TFEU enforcement procedure, secures 
legal commitments sufficiently effectively.  Far more infringements, 2900 in 
2009 (European Commission 2010: 3), are investigated than references made 
under Article 267 TFEU, 302 in 2009 (European Court of Justice 2010: 82). 
Compliance rates are reasonably high (Börzel 2001). It also carries less risk as 
it does not enfranchise new actors, such as domestic courts or litigants, with 
unpredictable preferences.  
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Table 1: The Sectors of Litigation 2 
 
 
The rulings in this period reflect this. There are, according to the Court of 
Justice, 49 fields of legislative activity. During this period there were 
preliminary rulings in 35 of them. However, Table 1 illustrates that the 
number of rulings in most was minimal. In only 13 fields were there more 
than 15 judgments – a threshold of one reference for every 5.4 Member States 
per year. The situation is even more concentrated when one looks at where 
                                                        
2 A large number of the titles are cryptic. ‘Industrial policy’ involves judgment on harmonisation 
of legislation on network industries; ‘Law of Undertakings’ concerns EU public procurement law; 
‘External Relations’ involved association or neighbourhood agreements with non-EU States and 
invariable focussed on the rights of non-EU migrants under these. AFSJ is Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. PJCCM is Policing and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. 
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litigation is clustered. If the economic freedoms are placed together on the 
grounds that these are interpreted in parallel manners and represented by 
single provisions in other jurisdictions (e.g. the commerce clause in the United 
States) and the common customs tariff and customs union are treated as a tax, 
over 80% of case law was in seven fields: the economic freedoms, 
harmonisation of laws, taxation, freedom, security and justice, environment, 
agriculture and social policy.  
Secondly, Member States taking risks through significant steps in the 
integration process (e.g. accession, new EU competencies, ambitious Action 
Plans) would rarely wish to generate further volatility by allowing 
unpredictable constituencies to manage expectations over these through the 
preliminary reference procedure. This leads to little direct link between 
judicial integration and the integration process more generally. References 
are, thus, very stable across time, notwithstanding other developments in the 
integration process. The pattern of references set out in Table 1 follows an 
almost identical pattern to that of Brunell, Stone Sweet and Harlow in their 
work on preliminary rulings up to 2006, with the sole exception of the 
emergence of the area of freedom, security and justice as a significant field of 
referral (Brunell et al. 2008). Significant legislative programmes such as the 
1992 programme or the Financial Services Action Programme do not lead to 
corresponding surges in referrals. In the case of the 1992 programme, Brunell 
et al. discovered that references moved from about 3.8% of references in the 
late 1980’s to 7.7% of references by the end of the 1990s, but this still 
accounted for only about 30 references per year or, put another way, two per 
year from each Member State (Brunell et al. 2008: 27).  Similarly, the accession 
of the ten member States in 2004 has not yet led to an increase in preliminary 
rulings – with 254 in 2005 and 259 in 2009 (European Court of Justice 2010: 
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86).3 Furthermore, there has been pre-emption of the preliminary reference 
procedure where a new field was anticipated to generate large numbers of 
references. Most notably, the establishment of the area of freedom, security 
and justice (AFSJ) at the Treaty of Amsterdam was accompanied by a limiting 
of the preliminary reference procedure to Member States who chose to opt-in 
for policing and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJCCM; Art. 35 
TEU)4 and a confining of the power to refer to courts against whose decisions 
there was no judicial remedy for all other matters connected to AFSJ (Art. 68 
TEU).5  
 
(ii) The Norms of Judicial Politics: Patrol Norms and Thickly Evaluative 
Norms 
If law-makers only deploy the preliminary reference procedure when it offers 
comparative institutional advantages, this begs the question what sort of 
justiciable entitlement would confer such advantage. There are two: patrol 
norms and thickly evaluative norms.6 
Patrol Norms: Actors dominant in the law-making process have no interest in 
the provision of entitlements which allow others to undermine their interests 
through litigation. However, most cannot fully rely on the centralised 
enforcement procedure to secure their interests insofar as the Commission has 
discretion over the use of this procedure. There is therefore an interest in 
entitlements which allow additional patrolling of commitments and the 
finessing of entitlements as preferences evolve (patrol norms). Examples 
                                                        
3 The rulings given in 2005 were all given on references made before the date of accession. It is 
thus the most reliable date for comparing pre and post accession patterns. 
4 Article 35 TEU. 
5 Article 68 EC. 
6 Litigants are also given powers to challenge abuse by EU Institutions or significant regulatory or 
administrative powers before the General Court (e.g. competition and intellectual property). On 
litigant composition here see Harding and Gibbs 2005; Tridimas and Gari 2010. 
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would be market access rights, rights of due process, rights to challenge 
administrative decisions which prohibit activity, tax, or refuse to grant 
financial entitlements. These are likely to be more prevalent in those sectors 
where deviance generates significant costs for other constituencies – be it 
denial of market access, significant distortions of competition between 
undertakings as a result of uneven application of regulatory burdens, illegal 
taxation or a failure to distribute financial entitlements – as these provide a 
motivation for patrol. Consequently, patrol norms are confined to EU 
secondary legislation. The EU Treaties are framework-treaties with few 
precise commitments with identifiable externalities to be patrolled. This is in 
stark contrast to sectors dominated by detailed legislation with precise 
commitments, notably the single market, agriculture, taxation, environment 
and consumer policy, and the area of freedom, security and justice insofar as 
it applies to judicial cooperation in civil matters.  
Patrol norms are more closely associated with the first judicial role identified, 
namely that of securing common policies and the prevention of free-riding 
and institutionalisation of collective action necessary for these. However, to 
prevent disturbance of the legislative equilibrium the law-maker only grants 
such norms in narrowly confined circumstances and where their predominant 
utility is to parties dominant in the law-making process. Looking at Table 1, 
one would expect them to account for most of the litigation in the single 
market (approximation of laws, industrial policy and law of undertakings), 
agriculture, taxation (including customs union and common customs tariff), 
and some of the environmental litigation. If one includes all environmental 
and consumer rulings these sectors account for at best 295 judgments during 
the period. This is over half of the case law analysed, and therefore a 
predominant part of the Court’s work. However, it is dwarfed by the 
respective legislation in the sectors. The three single market headings 
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comprised, according to Eur-lex, a total of 1,417 Regulations and Directives; 
Environment 992 such instruments, and Agriculture 5,285. Referrals are, thus, 
very much the exception with the single market and agriculture averaging 
one ruling per 20 and 117 pieces of legislation respectively during the period. 
Thickly evaluative norms: These are value-laden norms whose meaning and 
evaluative resonance cannot be understood in any strong way separately from 
the factual contexts in which they arise (Penner 2003). An example is 
discrimination. It is impossible to explain why offering an advantage to one 
party over another is egregious without placing it in a context which indicates 
why it is so. These norms challenge the balance about ethical commitments in 
most laws whereby the latter are only articulated at a certain generality 
allowing consensus to be maintained where there is deep disagreement. With 
thickly evaluative norms their heavy reliance on context entails that the initial 
legal commitments are too vague whilst implementation, by virtue of its 
being where the action takes place, is highly charged. Courts are thus, 
typically, deployed, first, because they receive information later than the law-
maker and are thereby better placed to consider the consequences of different 
applications of the norm (Rogers 2001). Secondly, judicial reasoning is well 
suited to thick evaluation as it is based on an application of norms to factual 
situations and consideration of the wider implications of this. Thirdly, the 
parameters of the dispute allow different parties to plead that the ambiguity 
concealing disagreement is not resolved beyond the factual scenario at the 
heart of the dispute.  
Thickly-evaluative norms are more closely associated with the second role of 
the judiciary, the entrenching of certain belief-systems. They can be present in 
all sectors as no sector is either value-free or unmarked by deep contingency. 
They are, however, prevalent in sectors oriented exclusively around Treaty 
provisions (economic freedoms, competition, economic opportunities) as 
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these provisions set out values to be realised rather than detailed programmes 
of actions. They are also present in sectors more explicitly concerned with the 
allocation of values – be they AFSJ and PJCCM insofar as they raise civil 
liberties and public order concerns, and much labour, environmental and 
consumer protection legislation insofar as they have resort to notions of 
fairness (labour or consumer law) or precaution (environmental law).  These 
sectors all feature heavily in Table 1. 
The prevalence of thickly evaluative norms is even more striking when one 
looks at the instruments deployed in the rulings. Regulations should be the 
most referred instrument. At the end of 2009, according to Eur-lex, there were 
7717 Regulations in force and 1918 Directives; the circumstances in which 
Directives can be invoked in domestic courts are more constrained (Chalmers 
et al. 2010: 285-293) and Directives are deployed often because of the 
sensitivity of their content so there are higher political risks to judicial 
adventurism. However, the concern that it is problematic to resolve too much 
which leads Member States to agree Directives and Treaty provisions is the 
same as that which generates thickly evaluative legal norms.  
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Table 2: Litigated Instruments 
 
Primary/Secondary Law 2007 2008 2009 2007-9 
Primary 175 44 34 253 
% 50 22 17 30 
Secondary 173 152 167 492 
% 50 78 83 70 
Type of secondary Law 2007 2008 2009 2007-2009 
Regulation 49 42 69 160 
% 33 27 40 33 
Directive 84 98 95 277 
% 57 63 55 58 
Decision 0 2 1 3 
% 0 1 1 1 
Framework Decision 2 4 1 7 
% 2 3 1 2 
Convention 3 3 4 10 
% 2 2 2 2 
Other 9 6 3 18 
% 6 4 2 4 
 
Table 2 shows therefore that Directives account for 58% of the secondary 
legislation invoked in references whilst Regulations account for only 33%. A 
Directive is 6.7 times more likely to be referred than a Regulation. Similarly, 
Treaty provisions account for 30% of all referred cases, notwithstanding that, 
with the exception of Article 63 TFEU,7 all directly effective provisions date 
back to the original Treaty of Rome. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 This provision on free movement of capital dates back to the Maastricht Treaty. 
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4. Litigants’ Deployment of the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure8 
Although national courts formally make the references to the Court of Justice, 
often the reference will have been drafted by the litigants, and it is highly 
unusual, other than in criminal cases, for a national court to refer without one 
litigant pushing for it. Without such demand, the parties will simply settle, 
thereby taking the matter out of the hands of the courts.9 National courts 
have, thus, to be seen as gatekeepers in the process responding to litigant 
demand. Demand for references will only exist where one party wishes to 
reorient the legal settlement rather than make other choices such as asking the 
local court to apply EU law locally or looking for solutions which do not 
involve EU law. The comparative advantage of this choice will be governed 
by the relative return offered to litigants by the preliminary reference 
procedure compared to other institutional alternatives. Its value is less for 
parties with a wide variety of other avenues at their disposal for securing 
their preferences. By contrast, rulings become more attractive for parties 
marginalised within other venues (Alter and Vargas 2000; Slagter 2009). The 
value increases yet further if the reference opens up opportunity structures 
for parties where none existed before (Cichowski 2007; Alter 2009).  
The preliminary reference procedure has three features which bear upon the 
litigants’ calculation of advantage. It is time-consuming. The average period 
between the reference and Court of Justice judgment at the end of 2009 was 
                                                        
8 This article looked at litigants in the different sectors, whether they were domestic or 
transnational undertakings, domestic commercial actors, national administrations, private 
individuals or ‘other actors’, who were non-commercial actors most notably non-governmental 
organisations (ngos). Every judgment involves at least two parties and more where cases have 
been joined. In addition, the figures have to be read carefully. Many individuals are supported by 
ngos but this is often difficult to identify so there is some substitutability here. In addition, there 
is an over-representation  of the State insofar as often it is the body against whom an EU law 
action must be brought.  
9 Nyikos found, for example, that over half of the Court rulings lead to settlement by the parties 
without the need for further national court intervention (Nyikos 2003). 
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17.1 months (European Court of Justice 2010: 94), to which must be added 
time spent in the domestic legal system. It is ill-suited for those damaged by 
delay, e.g. those needing quick financial compensation or wishing to protect a 
market position. However, delay allows its use as a litigation strategy to 
weaken another litigant’s position or to secure injunctive relief from a disliked 
domestic law, thus allowing the litigant a period of grace from the law 
pending resolution of the dispute (Rawlings 1993). This benefits actors with 
interests exclusively in one State as any injunctive relief will fully protect their 
position as it will apply across the whole of their market, the national 
territory. Secondly, the procedure is expensive. For those seeking only financial 
compensation, the returns have to be significant, therefore, to seek a referral. 
However, these returns may be calculated not simply in terms of the dispute 
in question but in also terms of opportunity costs. Parties with on-going 
relations governed by EU law have therefore a bigger interest in a reference 
than those in a one-off transaction.  Finally, as a preliminary ruling resettles 
the legal settlement it attracts those who litigate to change the law to meet 
ideological preferences. Litigation offers high returns here as it does not require 
litigants to negotiate with other constituencies. Judgments of the Court of 
Justice are almost never overturned, and, in terms of profile for the litigants 
and entrenching particular belief-systems, rulings govern a large territory of 
nearly half a billion people. 
Table 3: Domain of Litigation10 
Type of Domain (percentage) 2007 2008 2009 2007-2009 
Public 62 51 47 53 
Private 37 49 53 46 
Domestic  64 60 60 62 
Transnational 35 40 39 38 
 
 
                                                        
10 A dispute was only classified as private if both parties were private actors. Similarly, a dispute 
was only classified as domestic if both parties were domestic actors. 
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Table 4: Litigating Constituencies 
Type of parties 2007 2008 2009 2007-2009 
Firms 88 83 107 278 
%  25 22 29 25 
Multinationals 36 48 48 132 
%  10 13 13 12 
State 147 150 127 424 
% 42 40 35 39 
Individuals 62 70 66 198 
%  18 19 18 18 
Other 17 25 18 60 
  5 7 5 5 
Sector of activity (firms and multinationals) 2007 2008 2009 2007-2009 
Agriculture/ fisheries 9 13 9 31 
%  64 9 5 6 
Industry 62 49 83 194 
% 31 32 45 41 
Services 63 74 83 220 
%  45 49 45 46 
Financial services 2 8 4 14 
% 1 5 2 3 
Not found 4 7 7 18 
% 3 5 4 4 
Industry subsectors 2007 2008 2009 2007-2009 
Producers 45 33 64 142 
% 38 22 47 40 
Distributors 47 44 39 130 
%  39 29 29 37 
Retailers 20 14 22 56 
%  17 9 16 16 
Not found 7 7 10 24 
  6 5 7 2 
Size of companies (firms and multinationals) 2007 2008 2009 2007-2009 
≤ 1000 employees 33 27 19 79 
% 26 22 12 19 
≥ 1000 employees 28 33 40 101 
%  22 26 26 25 
Not found 68 65 97 230 
% 53 52 62 56 
These incentive structures are cross-cutting, and attract a wide variety of 
litigants across the different fields. Across almost any prism of analysis, it is 
impossible to find a general dominance by one particular constituency or one 
style of dispute. Commercial actors make up only 37% of litigants. There is a 
spread between transnational enterprises and domestic firms, large firms and 
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smaller firms (less than 1,000 employees), the service, agricultural and 
industrial sectors. The different stages of the production process are also all 
well represented.  In terms of the style of dispute there is also a fairly even 
division between disputes involving only domestic parties and those where 
one party is either a transnational actor or foreigner, albeit that most disputes 
are clearly domestic in nature. There is also a fairly even division between 
disputes which are exclusively between private parties and those which 
involve the State or public actors. Such heterogeneity makes it impossible to 
point to a single dynamic pushing forward the preliminary reference process. 
If transnational exchange accounts have to explain the heavy incidence of 
wholly domestic disputes and the heavy number of disputes involving the 
services sector when it is subject to limited transnational exchange, neo-
functionalist accounts struggle to explain the wide array of actors and types of 
disputes present in the litigation. 
However, one would expect these general figures to break down according to 
whether there is litigation of patrol norms or thickly evaluative norms as 
these would benefit different constituencies, provide different opportunity 
structures and the judgments enjoy a different function for the litigating 
parties. To ascertain whether this is the case, it is necessary, in the first place, 
to break the litigation patterns according to sectors.  
 
(i) Patrol Norms and Their Constituencies 
Insofar as patrol norms typically benefit constituencies dominant in the law-
making process, it makes sense to analyse the take-up of references by the two 
parties most regularly dominant in the EU legislative process, transnational 
enterprises and national administrations. The value of the process is reduced 
for these by the possibility of institutional substitutes to secure their 
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preferences – be it legislative amendment or, in the case of transnational 
enterprises, various forms of alternative dispute settlement. In the light of this 
and the financial and temporal costs of a reference, there seem only two 
circumstances when there is an incentive to seek a reference. The first is the 
rare scenario where one of these actors finds no institutional substitute 
available and the law is sufficiently entrenched, costly and distant from its 
preferences. The second is where there is no institutional substitute available 
and the actor is in an on-going relationship with other actors (e.g. national 
regulatory or fiscal authorities). In such circumstances, there is an open nature 
to costs or opportunity costs from misaligned laws that can make a reference 
seem cheap.  
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Table 5: Parties Litigating in Different Sectors 
  Domestic firms Multinationals State Individuals Others 
Agriculture 31 6 40 10 4 
% 34 7 44 11 4 
Approximation of laws 27 23 18 11 5 
% 32 27 21 13 6 
AFSJ 15 6 7 25 3 
% 27 11 13 45 5 
Customs custom tariff 15 10 26 2 0 
% 28 19 49 4 0 
Competition 7 6 5 1 5 
% 29 25 21 4 21 
Customs Union 5 7 11 1 0 
% 21 29 46 4 0 
Environment & consumers 12 7 26 12 7 
% 19 11 41 19 11 
External relations 2 1 10 9 0 
% 9 5 45 41 0 
Free movement of capital 8 3 21 10 0 
% 19 7 50 24 0 
Free movement of goods 12 3 11 4 3 
% 36 9 33 12 10 
Free movement of persons 4 1 23 22 2 
% 8 2 44 42 4 
Freedom of establishment 8 5 18 6 4 
% 20 12 44 15 10 
Freedom to provide services 10 4 20 6 4 
% 23 9 45 14 9 
Industrial policy 7 6 10 1 2 
% 27 23 38 4 8 
Intellectual property 6 9 1 1 3 
% 30 45 5 5 15 
Law relating to undertakings 17 0 14 1 3 
% 49 0 40 3 9 
PJCCM 0 0 9 11 2 
% 0 0 41 50 9 
Social policy 9 5 22 28 4 
% 13 7 32 41 6 
Social security for migrant workers 1 0 11 10 0 
% 5 0 50 45 0 
Taxation 41 29 88 10 6 
% 24 17 51 6 3 
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Table 5 shows that litigation by transnationals is concentrated in the single 
market (approximation of laws, industrial policy and intellectual property) 
and fiscal fields (taxation, customs union and common customs tariff). The 
incidence is in all cases significant with transnationals accounting for 35% of 
non State parties. It is impossible to argue that this is because these sectors are 
transnational in nature. Taxation, for example, largely concerns value added 
tax (VAT), a tax governing a far larger proportion of economic activity than 
transnational trade. Instead, the pattern of litigation fits the thesis of a 
transnational society which generates its own transnational rules of the game 
and systems of dispute settlement which are then policed by transnational 
actors (e.g. Fligstein and McNichol 1998; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998; 
Fligstein 2008). However, the data also shows the limits of the transnational 
society thesis. Even in the sectors where transnational actors are prevalent 
they rarely predominate. The generalisability of legal entitlements enables 
other actors to invoke them and has given rise to a significant parallel 
dynamic in most of these sectors in which local industry litigates these norms 
domestically. However, the most telling limitation is the low levels of 
transnational litigation. Notwithstanding over 1400 pieces of legislation, the 
single market accounted for only 21 referrals per year of which transnationals 
comprised about one quarter of the litigating parties. It is simply something 
that is rarely used. 
The involvement of national administrations is high in almost all sectors. In 
large part, this is because the State is necessarily the target of EU litigation. 
However, as defendants, national administrations could always settle if they 
did not wish a referral. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that they provoke 
them. If a national administration wants to reorient the legal settlement 
within its territory it may regulate or tax at the perimeters of the formal 
competencies granted by EU law in order to align it with its domestic 
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preferences. This would most likely trigger a reference where it imposes 
significant costs or sufficiently restricts opportunities for that State’s subjects. 
In such circumstances, both constituencies have an interest in the ruling. The 
administration wishes to secure legal certainty for a new prerogative whilst 
parties subject to an on-going long-term fiscal or regulatory relationship with 
the administration can see unending costs unless they secure a favourable 
ruling.   
Table 5 shows, therefore, that national administration involvement is over 
40% in sectors where EU law has extended national regulatory, fiscal and 
penal capacities – be this environment law (Héritier et al. 1996; Anderson and  
Liefferink 1997:10-35), VAT in the field of taxation (Terra and Wattel 2008: 
120) or penal law (Chaves 2011: chapter 4). It is also high where EU law grants 
the State most control over private activities – be it be the extraction or grant 
of resources to individuals (agriculture, taxation), entry or expulsion of the 
territory (external relations, free movement of persons), removal of liberty 
(PJCCM) or significant and costly regulation (environment and consumers). 
By contrast, it is surprisingly low in fields where the administration would 
seem the natural defendant (approximation of laws, area of freedom, security 
and justice, free movement of goods) but these qualities are not present. 
 
(ii) Thickly Evaluative Norms and Their Constituencies 
As thickly evaluative norms concern situations whose dimensions are difficult 
to anticipate, their use is rarely confined to a limited range of litigants. This 
brings two types of litigant into the process largely absent from the referral of 
patrol norms: those wishing to use litigation to change the general legal 
settlement for ideological reasons and domestic traders wishing to use EU law 
to suspend – initially through interim relief and then through a ruling – a 
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disliked national law. In both instances, the value of the procedure is 
increased by the possible unavailability of institutional substitutes as there are 
strong possibilities that neither will have significant influence in either the 
domestic or EU law-making processes. However, alongside this, one would 
expect a slight under-representation from those constituencies who are the 
targets of the norms in question. These might be unhappy with the EU legal 
norms, but as their unhappiness is with EU law not domestic law, there is no 
easy possibility of interim relief. A referral, thus, brings no immediate relief 
for them but is a costly exercise with the risk that the Court will not accede to 
their preferences but will provide a ruling that exacerbates the situation.  
Table 5 shows sectors characterised by thickly evaluative norms – the 
economic freedoms, competition, social policy, environment and consumer 
policy, area of freedom, security and justice – are all marked by litigant 
diversity. This cannot be explained by reference to affinities of the sector. 
Competition, free movement of services and freedom of establishment all 
require, in principle, the presence or imminence of transnational trade for 
their instigation. Yet, in all cases, domestic enterprise litigation is higher than 
that of transnationals. A further feature of these fields is that all are marked 
by high numbers of domestic litigants – be it commercial or non-commercial. 
A consequence is if thickly evaluative norms may be transnational in 
provenance they are deployed in disputes which are highly local in substance 
and go, in the first place, to revision the domestic polity. The other feature of 
note is litigant diversity involving both commercial and non-commercial 
actors is present in all these sectors, including the economic freedoms. 
Litigation has moved these away from being simply market provisions to the 
point where they are being deployed by non-commercial actors to secure 
broader entitlements from domestic administrations. Finally, there is the 
under-representation of certain classes of litigant who are disadvantaged by 
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the reference procedure. Two sectors, Social Policy and Environment and 
Consumer, are characterised by low commercial activity, notwithstanding 
that these will often be defendants and will bear the brunt of aggressively 
expanding equal opportunities or consumer protection law. Put simply, this is 
because there is no evidence of their acting as plaintiffs in this field or of 
engineering a dispute to push back the law here. 
 
5. Preliminary Rulings and the Judicial Decision 
The Court’s interest in its judgments is to secure authority for itself and its 
work. However, there are a wide variety of constituencies it has to satisfy.  To 
be sure, this includes litigants and governments. It is, thus, more likely to 
accept a point argued by a greater number of States or by parties privy to the 
dispute (Granger 2004; Carrubba et al. 2010). More general literature on courts 
suggests reputation within legal and judicial peer communities weights 
particularly heavily on these (Miceli and Coşgel 1994; Schauer 2000). The 
views of senior courts and legal specialists matter (Stein 1981; Schepel and 
Wesselink 1997; Alter 2009: 63 et seq.). However, courts’ wider authority with 
their subjects is dependent on their arguments appearing to be legally rather 
than politically reasoned (Gibson et al. 2005). There is, thus, a premium in 
making arguments perceived by these constituencies as legally appropriate, 
intellectually cogent and principled. Prior case law weighs particularly 
heavily on the decision-making of the Court (Komárek 2011: chapters 6 and 
7). 
To mediate between these interests in a legally reasoned manner, the Court 
adopts particular roles in relation to types of dispute. These provide a 
template which settles other parties’ expectations of what the Court will do 
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and what they can ask of it. They also allow the Court some autonomy as it 
does not have to make the case anew each time. The role of the Court is 
shaped, in the first place, by what norms it is asked to adjudicate and, in the 
second place, by whom it is asked to adjudicate these norms for, namely the 
parties in the dispute and significantly affected third parties. 
Disputes involving patrol norms invariably regard challenges to the exercise 
of regulatory, fiscal and penal capacities by national administrations on the 
basis that these have breached very specific commitments rather than any 
deep-seated values. This typically calls the Court into two types of role. The 
first, that of welfare constitutionalism, asks courts to contribute towards 
helping government to secure collective goods set out or respected by EU law 
(ie regulation of externalities, collection of taxes, security). This role may 
involve redirecting other arms of government but there is a concern not to 
disrupt the provision of these goods or subvert the institutional processes 
realising these (Barber 2003; Murphy 2007). The second role derives from the 
Court having to secure respect for the patrol norms. This typically brings into 
play a balancing role in which the Court seeks to ensure that neither the 
litigated interests nor the public good in question are unduly prejudiced. 
Neither role calls for the Court to make judgments with a high salience. It is 
not asked to develop strong autonomous lines of case law or to mark out a 
striking judicial position which has wider social, economic or political 
consequences. Furthermore, the nature of patrol norms is that they impose 
obligations and entitlements on a limited range of parties so only a small 
number will be directly affected by a judgment (Chalmers et al. 2010: 285-
312). 
With thickly evaluative norms, the wider variety of parties privy to disputes 
pushes the Court to have a more strongly assertive role. Litigation by a wide 
range of constituencies can have destabilising effects on the law as a 
Damian Chalmers & Mariana Chaves 
 
25   
cacophony of voices all claim it means different things unless the Court 
establishes a strong line of case law which is sufficiently clear to align 
preferences. There are further pressures. Often such norms also serve to 
protect diffuse interests which are traditionally poorly served by majoritarian 
institutions (e.g. minorities, women, consumers, the environment, foreign 
traders or poorly organised commercial interests). This leads to both an 
absence of detailed legislative direction and to arguments for a stronger 
judicial role to rectify this representative deficit on the basis not only that this 
is desirable (Maduro 1998) but that it is a feature of judicial tradition and one 
of the bases for public support for the judiciary (Vanberg 2001; Friedman 
2003).  
Table 6:  Salient Judgments 
Field   Number of Cases per Field Number  of 
Salient 
Judgments 
Percentage 
of Salient 
Judgments  
Taxation 87 6 6.90 
Agriculture 45 4 8.89 
Approximation of laws 41 13 31.71 
Social policy 33 16 48.48 
Environment & consumers 32 11 34.38 
AFSJ 27 9 33.33 
Customs custom tariff 26 0 0 
Free movement of persons 26 11 42.31 
Freedom to provide services 22 11 50 
Free movement of capital 21 8 38.10 
Freedom of establishment 20 10 50 
Law relating to undertakings 17 5 29.41 
Free movement of goods 16 8 50 
Competition 12 6 50 
Customs Union 12 1 8.33 
Industrial policy 12 2 16.67 
External relations 11 4 36.36 
PJCCM 11 6 54.55 
Social security for migrant workers 11 2 18.18 
Intellectual property 10 5 50 
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One would therefore expect sectors dominated by thickly evaluative norms to 
give rise to a higher percentage of significant judgments than those 
dominated by patrol norms. Table 5 suggests that sectors characterised by 
such norms tend to give rise to more salient judgments. All the economic 
freedoms, other than free movement of capital, and competition have 40% or 
more of their rulings characterised as significant. Sectors governed by EU 
secondary legislation move along a scale. At one end are two sectors, social 
policy and PJCCM, heavily informed by thickly evaluative norms for which 
48% and 55% of their judgments are deemed significant during this period. 
There are, then, a number of sectors – approximation of laws, industrial policy 
and environment and consumers – where about one third of the rulings are 
deemed significant. These are sectors where issues of mutual commitment, 
and thus patrol norms, are prevalent. However, regulatory or fundamental 
rights norms arise which are thickly evaluative in nature, politically salient, 
and generate interpretive uncertainty to be resolved by judges. Finally, there 
are those sectors, taxation and agriculture, dominated by patrol norms with 
few thickly evaluative norms which have very low percentages of significant 
rulings. 
There is, however, a further reason for the distinction in salience, and this 
goes to the feedback dynamics surrounding Court judgments. The sectors 
(economic freedoms, competition, intellectual property, social policy) in 
which there are the highest proportion of significant judgments are also those 
characterised by heavy lines of case law. This is paradoxical as one would 
expect prior rulings would limit the scope for significant subsequent rulings 
which would simply follow in their footsteps.  
However, with patrol norms, the presence of institutional substitutes for the 
affected constituencies means that, irrespective of the voting requirements in 
the Council, there is frequent legislative revision of adjudicated instruments. 
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The centrepiece of EU tax law litigation, the Sixth VAT Directive, was for 
example, prior to its recasting in 2006 revised thirty one times in its thirty 
years.11 Such a shifting legal settlement relativises the importance of any 
judgment and also increases the possibility of legislative over-rule. 
As thickly evaluative norms enfranchise or adversely affect a wide number of 
constituencies, judgments touch more directly many more parties not privy to 
the dispute. For many of these the relative return of preliminary references is 
high as there are few institutional substitutes for securing their preferences. 
Even if the original constituencies are satisfied with the new legal settlement 
set out in a judgment, these ‘new entrants’ who are now possibly empowered 
by it will wish to now use the reference procedure that more fully secures 
their preferences. The referral process, thus, generates its own feedback loops 
where case law leads to further litigation which in turn provokes more rulings 
and so on. However, in each case as it was new constituencies making their 
own demands, these were often quite significant in political economic terms.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The dual dynamics of patrol norms and thickly evaluative norms reveals both 
the significance and challenges of both the Court of Justice and EU law. The 
low salience of patrol norms and their use by a narrow range of constituencies 
raises issues about capture of the judiciary. Thickly evaluative norms explain 
the salience of the Court of Justice. They draw it into the allocation of values 
and amplification of beliefs in charged circumstances that are simultaneously 
                                                        
11 Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of laws relating to turnover taxes, OJ 1997, L 145/1. 
For the list of amendments see  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l31006_en.htm#AMENDINGACT <accessed 1 
April 2011> 
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strongly embedded in local contexts and ones that local settlements have been 
unable to resolve consensually. However, they occur in sectors which 
represent a small proportion of total EU law, are institutionally distinct from 
the other processes of EU law and constitute a very different quality of 
integration from the rest of the EU institutional settlement, namely securing 
belief systems rather realising common policy. Even if the Union were to have 
such a role, this still begs the question why it is the Court of Justice that 
should have a monopoly over this, and whether, if we started anew, the 
central values we should wish the Union to secure are an ad hoc mixture of 
economic liberalism, equal opportunities and labour rights. 
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